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"Anthrax an ‘inside job.'" "culprit is a former member of the US biological weapons programme… must have had access to American military anthrax… might have kept a vial around for years." Yeah. Right.

I was on Fox News the other day (the morning show, ah, E.D. sigh...) The guy on before me was "an expert in bioterrorism" from Harvard. We talked a little about the anthrax "thing" and he pronounced that the best theory was "a disgruntled lab worker." He's an expert, he should know what he's talking about.

He should know what he's talking about, but he don't. And this former grunt's here to tell you what he's ignoring and what the people who are pointing fingers as "former researchers" are ignoring (and not telling you.) Let's look at the facts we know.

The anthrax is "highly weaponized" (very "slippery" for superior penetration of the lungs.) The anthrax is "highly lethal" (high toxicity strain, probably resistant to the immunization shots.) The anthrax is "non-resistant" (you can kill it with penicillin.) The anthrax has been distributed in an operationally ineffective way; the same amount could have wiped out a major sky-scraper before anyone realized there was a problem.

For a really serious anthrax attack, you want a product that is highly weaponized (slippery), highly lethal (toxic), well distributed and resistant to antibiotics. Now, to make "garden variety" anthrax isn't much harder than making home-brew beer, and takes about the same quality of equipment. Furthermore, until recently you could get the strains and materials to make it fairly easily (since it is a pest in animal husbandry and there's a lot of research.) Making that sort is child's play to anyone who has had college level biochemistry or molecular biology (such as moi not to put too fine a point on it.) But to make "weaponized" anthrax requires extensive knowledge, knowledge you can't pick up (anywhere that I've found) on the net. Then there's the equipment.

Look anything you need to make really "good" anthrax you can buy from a company called VWR. But VWR's equipment don't come cheap. You'll need a hood. You'll need pipetters. You'll need plasmid cultures. You'll need collators. You'll need dessicators. The hood's going to run you just under 50 grand. Dessicators between ten and twenty Gs. Collators, the sky's the limit. Our "disgruntled lab worker" or "former member of the programme" is going to be shelling out between 100 and 500 Big Ones. That ain't chump change.

As to "doing it on the sly", a professor might be able to get away with that, but "a disgruntled lab worker" is going to have a very hard time of it.

Liberal microbiology professor at a noted Northeastern University: "Well, disgruntled conservative wacko lab-worker, what is it that you've been doing that has so impacted your output?"

Disgruntled conservative wacko lab-worker, fingering his "Postal Worker of the Year" medal: "I am culturing e-coli for plasmid research."

Liberal microbiology professor, glancing in microscope: "No you are not! That is weaponized anthrax by the Phi Beta Kappa ring on my pinkie! I shall now call the Justice Department and denounce you properly!"

As to the "vial kept around for years", like everything else biological, anthrax has a shelf life. The good part (from a "wow, that's a good bioweapon" perspective) is that it's a long shelf life. But it's not 30 years, and that's about how long ago our anthrax stores were dumped. Somebody would have had to keep it very carefully for 30 years and even then the "degradation" would have been obvious to the investigators.

So we can pretty much dispense with either a retired government employee, unless they make a heck of a lot more than I think, or a disgruntled lab worker. Both feed into liberal stereotypes and the whole "this is a right-wing wacko" perception, but the facts indicate otherwise. Furthermore, the operational method is, frankly, fascinating. Because on its face it makes no sense.

Remember, what we want for a "good" anthrax attack is deaths. Deaths occur with lethal, resistant, "slippery" anthrax widely distributed in populated air. This anthrax was lethal and slippery, but not resistant, and the distribution method was almost guaranteed to minimize deaths. Any person working in a US bio lab has knowledge of how to make a bacteria resistant; resistance is used as a filter in research. Very few know how to make one slippery.

This indicates that the anthrax was a warning. Assuredly, it could have been from an off his rocker researcher at AMRIID, assuming he could scrounge up a quarter mil for the equipment. Or from almost anyone else. Examples: Eco-terrorists (many of whom are biology students) warning about Global Warming by striking at the senate. Any professor who has a grant for research into infectious diseases that is about to get axed. The Israelis to "increase the fear" in the United States and thus get more backing in the war on terrorism. The CIA to increase funding. The Illuminati to bring on the New World Order.

Any of these is as likely as "a disgruntled lab worker" or "a former member of the US Weapons programme." Whoever it was, it's apparent they were not intending wide-spread deaths. Anyone who knew how to make the stuff knew as much as I do about attack strategies. And this strategy was designed to minimize casualties.

Speculation? I've got lots of speculation. My speculation is Saddam. He has sleepers planted and anthrax is his version of "MAD." "You attack me, I kill lots your citizens." The answer that the Harvard guy gave was "he's not stupid enough to do that. He's sitting pretty right now."

A quote from Norman Schwartzkopf comes to mind. Paraphrased: "In the Persian Gulf War, at every decision point, Saddam Hussein chose the one most likely to do him harm."

Call that one "Persian Gulf I." I think the "Pearl Harbor" of Persian Gulf II was a letter to Tom Daschle.

And I think "he'll find out" what we think of that.